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[6]. Hence, current physical layer authentication mech-
anisms are an efficient solution in static networks, but
not suitable in mobile environments [7].
Exploiting physical layer parameters in order to attain
different security aspects has been widely encouraged
[8]–[10] as it provides less complexity and lighter cost
as compared to the conventional security mechanisms.
Different previous works in the literature propose au-
thentication schemes that are based on physical layer
approaches. For example, in [11], the time-varying car-
rier frequency offset of the transmitter is used as an RF
signature for authentication purpose. In [12], a hypoth-
esis testing is applied to determine whether the current
received message and the previous one are from the same
transmitter. Specifically, the channel propagation effects
in the current and the previous messages are compared
in order to verify if both received messages are sent by
the same transmitter or not. It assumes that the trans-
mitter is already authenticated in the beginning, and the
proposed scheme serves as a physical-layer verification
process that avoids repeating the conventional authen-
tication. However, in case of mobile users, it becomes
unrealistic assumption that channel propagation effects
remain static over time. The difference between two
consecutive noise-mitigated channel impulse response is
adopted in [13] as an authentication base. Alternatively,
the phase response is used for authentication in multi
carrier systems in [14]. A two dimensional quantization
algorithm that enhances the physical-layer authentication
is proposed in [15] which overcomes the impact of
noise and channel estimation errors. In [16], the same
authors of [12] have alleviated the negative impact of
the mobility on their proposal by considering data are
transmitted in burst that contains multiple frames. Thus,
at least one probed channel response of the last data
burst is used to authenticate the next data burst. A
similar approach has been followed in [17] based on
a MIMO scenario and different attack strategies. Unlike
the above mentioned works, in [18], the power spectral
density of the channel realizations has been considered
as an authentication base. Specifically, the power spectral
Abstract—Exploiting physical layer in achieving differ-
ent security aspects in wireless communications has been 
widely encouraged. In this work, we propose an entity 
authentication scheme for mobile devices with multiple 
antennas, that is purely based on physical layer parameters. 
According to the proposed scheme, in order to authenticate 
a device, a number of predefined a uthentication signals 
should be detected at the receive antennas on the authen-
ticator side. The transmitted signals are designed based 
on the instantaneous channel responses in order to deliver 
the authentication signals to the receiver. The proposed 
scheme works efficiently e ven f or m obile u sers, w hich is 
considered a significant improvement over previous related 
works. Mathematical analysis for the different involved 
factors along with sufficient s imulations s how t he high 
performance of the proposed authentication scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entity and message authentication are primary require-
ments in any personal, commercial or military applica-
tion that makes use of a secure channel. Communicators 
need to authenticate each other in order to initiate the 
communication and authenticate the origin of each re-
ceived message [1]. Conventionally, entity authentication 
is performed through the exchange of public-key based 
certificates, w here e ntities a uthenticate e ach o ther and 
negotiate a symmetric key used for message authentica-
tion. When data transmission commences, the symmetric 
key is used to generate message authenticated codes 
(MACs) that are attached to the transmitted messages 
and that can be verified on reception [2], [3]. Both, entity 
authentication and message authentication processes can 
be seen as resource waste processes due to the require-
ment of exchanging certificates a nd a ttaching M ACs to 
messages. An approach for alleviating the overhead cost 
in conventional authentication is by using physical layer 
to accomplish authentication between communicators 
[4], [5]. However, current physical layer authentication 
schemes, mainly based on channel correlation, require 
a conventional cryptographic-based authentication every 
time that the physical layer mechanism fails, which 
occurs frequently due to the communicators’ mobility
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the proposed authentication scheme. In Section IV, an
attack model has been considered and analyzed. Section
V explores theoretical and simulation results, and con-
clusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered system model consists of two commu-
nicators, Alice and Bob, as shown in Fig. 1. Alice acts
as a legal transmitter and is equipped by Nt transmit
antennas, while Bob acts as receiver and is equipped
by Nr receive antennas. The channel matrix between
Alice and Bob is denoted by H, where its entries hij
(1 ≤ i ≤ Nt and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr) represents the
channel response between the ith transmit antenna and
the jth receive antenna. Without loss of generality, hij is
modeled as a complex Gaussian random variables with
zero means and σ2 variance. The received signal at the




hijxi + nj (1)
where xi is the transmitted signal from the ith antenna,
and nj is an additive white Gaussian noise with zero
mean and σ2n variance.
Fig. 1. The considered system model of Alice and Bob. Alice is
assumed a mobile user.
Alice is assumed a mobile user, while Bob always has
a fixed position. The channel response between them is
assumed correlated over time. Thus, the channel matrix
at a specific time instant Ht is expressed as follows
Ht = ρHt−1 +
√
1− ρ2H (2)
where Ht−1 represents the channel matrix of the pre-
vious time instant, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the time correlation
coefficient, and H is independent of Ht−1. The value
of ρ depends on the mobility of Alice, where if Alice
stays on the same position over the two consecutive
density of the current channel realization is compared 
to the previous ones through a hypotheses test. If they 
are identical, subsequent messages will be authenticated; 
otherwise, sender is considered as an attacker. However, 
there are two main drawbacks in [12], [18]. First, if an 
attacker can get one transmitted message authenticated, 
then it will get subsequent messages authenticated as 
well. Second, all of them suffer from the inefficient 
performance in highly mobile users due to the time 
varying channel characteristics. Thus, attackers might be 
able to successfully authenticate messages. while legal 
users encounter high authentication fail rate.
Previous works require an entity re-authentication 
process, through a conventional cryptographic protocol, 
when the message authentication fails, which increases 
significantly t he o verhead. I n t his p aper w e s olve this 
issue by proposing a novel physical layer authenti-
cation approach to re-authenticate the communicators. 
Two main assumptions have been considered in the 
proposed scheme. First, the channel responses of MIMO 
scheme are assumed available exclusively at the legiti-
mate transmitter and the receiver. This can be performed 
using channel reciprocity in TDD without a need for 
a feedback link [12]. Second, an initial authentication 
phase is performed using conventional authentication 
protocols. The channel response matrix at the initial 
authentication phase is stored at both sides as it will be 
used later in the re-authentication of the same transmitter 
rather than the conventional authentication. Specifically, 
at each entity re-authentication phase, the initial channel 
response together with the current channel response are 
used to generate a set of authentication signals. Then, 
the transmitter will precode its transmitted signals from 
all antennas, based on the current channel response, in 
order to deliver the predefined a uthentication signals 
at all receive antennas. If a predefined n umber o f the 
authentications signals is detected at the receiver, the 
transmitter is successfully authenticated. After each suc-
cessful entity re-authentication phase, the stored channel 
matrix is updated according to a function whose inputs 
are the previously stored channel and the current channel 
matrix. Then, subsequent message transmissions can be 
compared with the updated channel characteristics for 
message authentication purposes, without requiring a 
new cryptographic-based authentication process between 
communicators. As such, a high performance is expected 
even in the case of the mobile users. A mathematical 
analysis of the authentication fail rate are presented along 
with investigation of the impact of different parameters. 
Moreover, a suitable attack model is considered and its 
performance is analyzed as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II describes the system model, while Section III presents
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time instants, a large value of ρ should be assumed.
Otherwise; if Alice moves in another position, the value
of ρ is reduced.
Prior data transmission, a channel estimation process
is performed by Alice and Bob. The results of this pro-
cess are available only for the two ends and hidden from
any other party. This can be accomplished by avoiding
the feedback link between Alice and Bob, where channel
response is estimated individually by Alice and Bob by
forward and reverse link pilots in TDD systems [12].
At the beginning, an initial authentication phase is
accomplished once between Alice and Bob using a pre-
shared private key [2]. The estimated channel matrix
during the initial phase is stored at both sides, and
denoted by H0.
III. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
As mentioned earlier, conventional authentication pro-
tocols generate a heavy overhead, and consequently,
consume a significant portion of the available resources.
To this end, lightweight authentication schemes are
highly required. Previous physical-layer authentication
schemes show a good performance of semi-static users.
However, in the case of mobile users, their performance
is significantly degraded. In the following we present a
physical-layer entity re-authentication scheme for mobile
MIMO-based users. The proposed scheme follows the
same approach of previous works for message authenti-
cation, but it introduces a novel physical layer entity re-
authentication scheme to re-authenticate the communica-
tors when the message authentication fails due to channel
variations. It is worth noting that previous works rely on
conventional entity authentication (generally PKI-based
authentication) to re-authenticate the communicators.
The proposed approach provides an effective manner to
perform a non-cryptographic entity authentication.
The proposed scheme includes three phases, namely,
the initialization phase, the message authentication
phase and the entity re-authentication phase. In the
initialization phase, a conventional public key authen-
tication [2] is used to authenticate Alice. The channel
responses matrix during the initialization phase, denoted
by H0, is stored at Alice and Bob. During next data
transmissions, the message authentication phase is run by
Bob. Specifically, Bob always verifies if the transmitter
is still Alice or not. For this purpose, Bob uses any of
the physical-layer message authentication schemes [12]-
[18]. In detail, to verify Alice at time t, Bob compares
the difference between H0 and Ht to predefined thresh-
old (λ) as follows
∆H = ‖H0 −Ht‖2 ≶ λ (3)
if ∆H ≤ λ, Bob will verify Alice. Otherwise, ∆H > λ,
Bob will realize that either Alice has moved to another
position or the transmitter is not Alice. Accordingly, Bob
will ask Alice to re-authenticate himself. The entity re-
authentication phase is performed as follows
1) Both Alice and Bob will estimate the current chan-
nel response Ht.






where Zt is an Nr×1 vector, and f(·) is predefined
function between Alice and Bob. The elements of
Zt are called the authentication signals.
3) Alice will calculate a Nt × 1 transmission vector
Xt as follows
Zt = HtXt (5)
and the calculated Xt will be transmitted towards
Bob. Notice that the jth element of Zt, denoted by





4) At Bob’s side, the received signal at the jth antenna,




hijxi + nj = zj + nj (7)
where nj (1 ≤ j ≤ Nr) is an additive white
complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and σ2n
variance.
For all receive antennas, Bob will compare the
difference between yj and zj to the predefined
threshold δ as follows
‖yj − zj‖2 ≶ δ (8)
if it is less than δ, the jth authentication signal is
considered correctly received. Otherwise, it will be
considered incorrectly received.
5) According to the previous step, if the number of the
authentication signals that are correctly received is
larger than or equal to the predefined threshold K,
Alice will be authenticated. Otherwise, the trans-
mitter will be considered an attacker and will not
be authenticated.
6) In the case that Alice is authenticated in step 5, the
channel matrix H0 will be removed and the current
channel matrix Ht will be stored as H0. Therefore,
for any next transmission, message authentication
will be performed according to (3).
Notice that applying conventional authentication pro-
tocols in all phases is a huge expenditure in users’ re-
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sources. On the other hand, although physical layer mes-
sage authentication schemes [12]- [18] are considered
lightweight, their efficiency is very low in case of mobile
users because they require the entities to re-authenticate
through conventional crypto-based protocols, generally
based on PKI. However, the proposed scheme works
efficiently even for mobile users and it avoids the crypto-
based re-authentication phase.
Another issue that worths emphasizing is that the
additional computational complexity of the proposed
scheme mainly depends on the chosen function f(·)
in (5). Thus, simplifying the chosen function leads to
a slight increase in the computational complexity as
compared to the previous physical-layer techniques.
A. Mathematical Analysis
In this section, the performance of the proposed
scheme is investigated in terms of the message
authentication-fail rate and the entity re-authentication-
fail rate.
From (3), the message authentication-fail probability,
denoted by η, can be expressed as follows
η = Prob.{∆H = ‖H0 −Ht‖2 > λ} (9)
based on(2), ∆H has a gamma distribution
Gamma
(
NrNt, 2 − 2ρ
)
with the following Cumulative




γ(NrNt, (2− 2ρ)x) (10)
where γ(·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function. Conse-
quently, η is expressed as follows
η = 1− 1
(NrNt − 1)!
γ(NrNt, (2− 2ρ)λ) (11)
Notice that for static users (constant ρ), the threshold
λ can be tuned to reduce the message authentication-
fail probability. However, as the proper choice of λ
depends on ρ, the message authentication-fail rate cannot
be guaranteed for mobile users since ρ varies as users
move. Thus, the entity re-authentication phase is required
for mobile users.
The entity re-authentication-fail probability, denoted









where ζ is the probability that an authentication signal
is correctly received. We consider ζ is identical for all
authentication signals. Based on (8), ζ is given as follows
ζ = Prob.{‖yj − zj‖2 ≤ δ} = Prob.{‖nj‖2 ≤ δ} (13)
Notice that ‖nj‖2 is exponential distributed with a rate
1
σ2n
with the following CDF




Thus, ζ can be rewritten as follows




Finally, the probability that the whole authentication
process fails and the transmitter is declared as attacker
is given as follows
α = ηβ (16)
B. Low SNR Case
Under low SNR conditions, the impact of the added
noise is larger. Consequently, the entity re-authentication
fail rate of the proposed scheme will be higher. Thus,
in this section, we enhance the proposed scheme to
alleviate the noise impact. The enhancement implies
that re-authentication process can be repeated more than
once, say L times. Accordingly, an authentication signal
is considered correctly detected if it has been detected
at least once among the L times.
Accordingly, the probability that an authentication
signal is correctly detected, denoted by ζ(L), is given
as follow
ζ(L) = Prob.{ min
l=1,...,L
(‖ylj − zlj‖2) ≤ δ} (17)
which can be simplified as follows
ζ(L) = Prob.{ min
jl=1,...,L
(|nlj |2) ≤ δ} (18)
The value of min(|nlj |2) is the minimum of L expo-
nential random variables. Hence, using order statistics,









where F (x) is the exponential CDF given in (14). (19)
can be used to estimate ζ(L) as follows
ζ(L) = P1:L(δ) = 1− e
−Lδ2
σ2n (20)
Therefore, the re-authentication fail rate can be re-















Notice that in case that L = 1, (20) and (21) are reduced
to (15) and (12), respectively.
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IV. ATTACK MODEL
As the proposed authentication scheme depends
mainly on the instantaneous channel characteristics, only
attackers that have partial or perfect knowledge about
the channel responses can represent a significant threat
to the proposed scheme. To this end, we consider an
attack model that is perfectly aware of the instantaneous
channel responses between himself and Alice and be-
tween himself and Bob. However, only an imperfect
knowledge is available at the attacker about the channel
between Alice and Bob (i.e, H). The main intention
of the attack is to impersonate Alice and to get his
message authenticated at Bob’s receiver. Without loss
of generality, the attacker is assumed to have the same
number of transmit and receive antennas of Alice and
Bob (i.e, Nt and Nr, respectively). Also, seeking for
a seamless analysis, we use different notations for the
variables related to the attacker as follows. G denotes
the channel matrix between the attacker and Bob, S
denotes the formulated transmission vector from the
attacker in the re-authentication process, and P denotes
the authentication signals to be delivered by the attacker
to Bob. Fig. 2 describes the considered attack model.
Fig. 2. The considered system model of Alice and Bob in the presence
of an attacker (Eve).
In the following, three different attack strategies are
considered based on the available information about H0,
Ht and Xt at the attacker:
A. Attack Strategy A
Strategy A will be followed by an attacker that have
denoted by Ĥ0, that is given as follows
Ĥ0 = H0 + He (22)
where He is an estimation error matrix with entries
modeled as complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and εA variance. Attack strategy A works
as follows
1) The attack contacts Bob and both estimate the
channel Gt
2) Both will calculate the authentication signals vector
using the public function f(·). Specifically, the







while the attacker will calculate a different authen-






3) The attacker calculates its transmission vector St
such that P̂t = GtSt, and transmits it towards Bob.
4) The received vector at Bob is given as follows
Yt = P̂t + Nt (25)
where each element of Yt is compared to the
corresponding element in Pt, as given in (8).
B. Attack Strategy B
In this strategy, the attacker has no knowledge about
H0 but it has a partial knowledge about Ht. Specifically,
the attacker has a corrupted version of Ht, denoted as
Ĥt. Strategy B works as follows
1) The attack contacts Bob and both start a channel
estimate process. However, the attacker will modify
the pilot signals such that Bob is tricked and the
channel response appears as Ĥt at Bob’s receiver.
2) The attacker already overheard the authentication
phase between Alice and Bob, and obtained a
corrupted version of Alices’s transmission vector,
denoted by X̂t
3) Both will calculate the authentication signals vector
using the public function f(·). Specifically, the







while the attacker will calculate a different authen-
tication vector as follows
P̂t = ĤtX̂t (27)
4) The attacker calculates its transmission vector St
such that P̂t = GtSt, and transmits it towards Bob.
only partial information about H0. Specifically, w e as-
sume that the attacker has a corrupted version of H0,
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5) The received vector at Bob is given as follows
Yt = P̂t + Nt (28)
where each element of Yt is compared to the
corresponding element in Pt, as given in (8).
C. Attack Strategy C
This strategy is followed by an attacker in the case
that there is no knowledge about either H0 or Ht. Attack
strategy C works as follows
1) The attacker contacts Bob and both estimate the
channel Gt.
2) Bob will calculate the authentication signals vector






3) The attacker already overheard the authentication
phase between Alice and Bob, and obtained a
corrupted version of Alices’s transmission vector,
denoted by X̂t.
4) The attacker transmits X̂t towards Bob.
5) The received vector at Bob is given as follows
Yt = P̂t + Nt (30)
where P̂t is given as follows
P̂t = GtX̂t (31)
Each element of Yt is compared to the correspond-
ing element in Pt, as given in (8).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SIMULATION
RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed scheme by investigating all the involved pa-
rameters. The performance is measured in terms of the
authentication fail rate for Alice and and the considered
attack strategies. The curves obtained by Monte Carlo
simulations where 105 iterations are considered. At each
iteration, the one sided noise power σ2n is computed
2]
In order to highlight the motivation behind our pro-
posal, we investigate the performance of the previous
physical-layer schemes ( [12]- [16]) in case of mobile
users. Specifically, the fail rate of the message authenti-
cation given in (4) is plotted versus the mobility proba-
bility γ in Fig. 3 at different values of the threshold λ.
As shown, the message authentication fail rate increases
as the mobility of the transmitter increases. Increasing
the value of λ improves the message authentication
process. However, for highly mobile users, the message
authentication fail rate reaches 1. Notice that increasing
λ is not always feasible since it may allow attackers
to authenticate illicit messages. Also, we should expect
that assuming lower values of ρm will definitely lead
to a worse performance of the message authentication
phase.

































Fig. 3. The message authentication fail rate versus the mobility
probability (γ) for different values of the threshold λ. (Nt = 4,
Nr = 4, ρs = 0.9, ρm = 0.5 and SNR = 10 dB ).
Based on the results in Fig. 3, the previous physical-
layer message authentication schemes have a poor per-
formance for mobile users. Thus, our proposed scheme
is highly motivated. The proposed scheme implies that if
the message authentication phase fails, another physical-
layer entity re-authentication phase should be performed
in order to authenticate the transmitter. Fig. 4 shows
the entity re-authentication fail rate (i.e, β given in
(12)) and the overall authentication fail rate (i.e, α
given in (16)) of the proposed scheme versus the av-
erage SNR. Compared to previous works that consider
only message authentication schemes, the physical-layer
entity re-authentication phase can enhance the overall
authentication fail rate since it decreases the need for
crypto-based authentication protocols. Clearly, the fail
rates decrease as the SNR increases due to the less
impact of the noise on the re-authentication phase. Also,
notice the huge reduction in the authentication fail rate
in the two figures 3 and 4. For example, at γ = 0.2,
by σ2n = 
E[
SNR
X , where E[X2] is the transmitted signal 
power. Moreover, during the simulations, the function 
f(·) given in (4) is fixed a s f ollows fj (H0, H t) = 
diag{H0HtT } where diag{·} represents the diagonal 
operator, and T is the transpose operator.
Seeking for a general model of the mobile user, we 
denote the probability that the transmitter will move at 
a specific t ime i nstant t o d ifferent l ocation b y γ  (called 
mobility probability). In case that the user has moved 
to another location, the channel correlation coefficient 
is denoted by ρm and is assumed 0.5. On the other 
hand, if the user has not moved, the channel correlation 
coefficient is denoted by ρs and is assumed 0.9.
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λ = 3 and SNR=10 dB, the previous works achieves 0.8
(see Fig. 3), while the proposed scheme is able to reduce
it to only 0.02 (Fig. 4).

















Entity re−authentication fail rate
Overall authentication fail rate
Fig. 4. The overall authentication fail rate (α) and the entity re-
authentication fail rate (β) versus the average SNR. (Nt = 4, Nr = 4,
ρs = 0.9, ρm = 0.5, γ = 0.2, λ = 3, K = 1 and δ = 0.5 ).
Several parameters affect the performance of the pro-
posed scheme, such as δ, K and the average SNR. In
Fig. 5, the impact of the parameter δ is shown where
the authentication fail rate is plotted versus the average
SNR at different values of δ. Increasing the threshold δ
decreases the authentication fail rate because high values
of δ means that a larger noise power can be tolerated at
the receiver and more signals are considered correctly
authenticated. However, δ should not be very large in
order to avoid an incorrect authentication of an attacker.





























of K, at least K receive antennas must correctly identify
their corresponding authentication signals in order to
authenticate Alice. Thus, high values of K show increase
the authentication fail rate as shown in Fig. 6.






























Fig. 6. The authentication fail rate versus the average SNR for
different values of the threshold δ. (Nt = 4, Nr = 4, ρs = 0.9,
ρm = 0.5, λ = 3, η = 0.2 and δ = 0.5 ).
The resilience against attacks is of a paramount im-
portance in order to evaluate any authentication scheme.
Thus, aiming at analyzing the resilience against the
considered attack strategies in Section IV, we assume that
the message authentication fail probability is almost one
(i.e, the message authentication phase will always fail).
The purpose of this assumption is to better evaluate the
proposed re-authentication scheme which is the major
contribution of this work. Such an assumption can be
realized by setting a low value of λ (see Fig. 3). Also,
for a seamless analysis, we consider that the partial
information gained by an attacker on either Ho, Ht ,
Z, or Xt is modeled by an error matrix with the same
dimensions and entries are modeled by complex Gaus-
sian random variables with zero mean and ε variance
(exactly as formulated in (22)).
Fig. 7 plots the authentication fail rate versus the
average SNR for Alice and the three different attack
strategies considered in Section IV. For all attack strate-
gies, the error variance is assumed equal to the noise
power, i.e, ε = σ2n. For all curves, as SNR increases,
the noise power decrease, and hence the authentication
fail rate decreases as well. However, the big difference
between the legitimate transmitter Alice and the attacker
is clear and evident. Comparing the three different attack
strategies, it is noted that strategy A has the lowest fail
rate, while the others (strategies B and C) encounter a
very high authentication fail rate. This is due to the fact
that an attacker followed strategy A has partial infor-
mation about Ho which is the most effective parameter
in the proposed authentication scheme. On other hand,
Fig. 5. The authentication fail rate versus the average SNR for 
different values of the threshold δ. (Nt = 4, Nr = 4, ρs = 0.9, 
ρm = 0.5, λ = 3, K = 1 and η = 0.2 ).
The authentication threshold K has a similar effect of 
δ. In Fig. 6, the authentication fail rate is depicted versus 
the average SNR at different values of K. At each value
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an attacker following strategy B or C does not have
any information on Ho, which significantly degrades the
performance. Moreover, in strategy B, an attacker relies
on partial information about Ht and Xt, which degrades
the performance since two sources of error are present.
Regarding strategy C, information about Ho and Ht is
completely absent, and the strategy is based only in a
partial information about Xt.






























































Fig. 8. The authentication fail rate versus the threshold δ for Alice
and the different attack strategies considered in Section IV. (Nt = 4,
Nr = 4, ρs = 0.9, ρm = 0.5, λ = 2, η = 0.2, K = 1, SNR =
10 dB and ε = σ2n).
As a future work, the impact of the channel estimation
errors on the performance of the proposed scheme can
be investigated and analyzed. Also, the computational
complexity of the proposed scheme can be reduced in
order to improve its applicability in real scenarios.
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that have a partial knowledge about channel responses.
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